necessary adjustments as this industry develops. Any attempt by the Commission to resolve every access issue in a before the fact fashion is likely to result in rigid and unworkable rules, frustrating to both operators and programmers.^{31/}

D. The Commission's Announced Procedures Are Appropriate for Resolution of Leased Access Disputes.

At least one petitioner in this proceeding, CME, would impose severe disclosure obligations on cable operators in the event a dispute arises over rates, terms or conditions of leased access use. CME complains that, if cable operators are not forced to disclose the confidential data used to calculate maximum reasonable rates, leased access programmers will find it "virtually impossible . . . to make out a prima facie case, much less to prove a violation by clear and convincing evidence." Petition of CME at 18. CME would, therefore, require a cable operator to place all documentation supporting the calculation of its highest implicit rates (i.e., programming contracts) in the operator's public file. This requirement not only would violate the confidentiality provisions in many programming agreements, it would force cable operators to disclose extremely sensitive price information and wreak havoc in the programming marketplace.

Moreover, CME's plan is unnecessary because, once a complaint has been filed, the Commission will require the cable operator to submit data showing that the rate charged by the operator is not outside the "highest implicit fee" boundary. "If,

^{31/} The Commission already has recognized the futility of trying to address every element of the programmer/operator relationship. Order at ¶ 498 ("Given the diversity of possible access uses, [with regard to tier placement] we do not believe it desirable at this time to attempt an a priori allocation scheme.").

^{32/} Another petitioner would require an operator to publish "tiers of maximum rates, under the three broad categories of leased access use," prior to the commencement of negotiations. Petition of SUR at 12.

after the operator's submission, [the Commission finds] a prima facie violation of [its] rules, the operator might then be required to produce additional information." Order at ¶ 534 (emphasis added). The Commission has, therefore, assigned itself the task of determining whether a prima facie violation exists, based on a combination of the complaint and operator-provided data. In fact, the Order suggests that the pleading requirements for a programmer, at least in the rate dispute context, are not strict. The Joint Parties, therefore, strongly encourage the Commission to retain its announced procedures with respect to an operator's proprietary data. These procedures, in conjunction with the Commission's existing discovery rules, will protect cable operators from "fishing expeditions," while permitting appropriate access to sensitive information throughout the dispute resolution process.

CME further demands, without any rationale, that cable operators be afforded only ten to fifteen days to respond to a programmer's complaint. Petition of CME at 21. In addition, CME would hold operators liable for indeterminate "bad faith" or "unreasonable conduct" violations. <u>Id</u>. Thus, under the CME regime, cable operators could find themselves in a position of having to respond to ill-defined charges of "bad faith" within a week and a half to two weeks of receiving a complaint. Obviously, the Commission should reject both of these proposals as unfair and unnecessary.

Finally, the Commission must again firmly reject proposals to ignore the explicit statutory language of the Communications Act. In this case, petitioners desire to rewrite Section 612(f) of the law. This provision clearly establishes a presumption

^{33/} Despite the Commission's requirement that a complainant "state concisely the facts" of the alleged violation, it appears that a programmer would satisfy its pleading obligations in a rate dispute simply by alleging "that a given rate was higher than the maximum reasonable rate permitted under [the Commission] rules." Order at ¶ 534 n.1350.

that a cable operator's prices, terms and conditions for leased access are reasonable and in good faith, unless proven otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. CME, however, argues that because the 1992 Cable Act requires the Commission to determine "maximum reasonable rates" and "establish reasonable terms and conditions," any presumption that an operator's rates and other terms are already reasonable is a nullity. In effect, CME urges the Commission to ignore the plain language of the statute and shift the mandated burden of proof from the programmer to the cable operator. Again, the Commission must decline the invitation to rewrite the statute.

^{34/} See Petition of CME at 20 (presumption of reasonableness and good faith eliminated by 1992 Cable Act amendments); but see Petition of SUR at 12 ("Section 612(f) of the 1992 legislation did not modify the 1984 provisions, even though the Commission recommended to Congress that the burden of proof set forth therein be modified." (emphasis added)).

VI. Conclusion

For all the foregoing reasons, the Commission should deny the petitions addressed in this opposition.

Respectfully submitted,

THE JOINT/PARTIES

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APPENDIX A

The Joint Parties

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Comcast Corporation

Cox Cable Communications, a division of Cox Communications, Inc.

First Carolina Communications, Inc.

Jones Intercable, Inc.

Mid-Coast Cable Television, Inc.

Service Electric Cablevision, Inc.

Vista Communications, Inc.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing "Opposition to Petitions for Reconsideration" of the Joint Parties was served this 21st day of July, 1993, by delivery thereof by first class mail, postage prepaid, to the parties on the attached list.

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